Michigan Law Review
Volume 40

Issue 3

1942

LABOR LAW - SEAMEN - REINSTATEMENT OF SIT-DOWN
STRIKERS
David N. Mills
University of Michigan Law School

Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mlr
Part of the Admiralty Commons, and the Labor and Employment Law Commons

Recommended Citation
David N. Mills, LABOR LAW - SEAMEN - REINSTATEMENT OF SIT-DOWN STRIKERS, 40 MICH. L. REV. 468
(1942).
Available at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mlr/vol40/iss3/16

This Regular Feature is brought to you for free and open access by the Michigan Law Review at University of
Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Michigan Law Review by an
authorized editor of University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository. For more information, please
contact mlaw.repository@umich.edu.

MICHIGAN LAW REVIEW

LABOR LAW -

SEAMEN -

[ Vol. 40

REINSTATEMENT oF Srr-DowN STRIKERS -

While a ship whose home port was Philadelphia was at dock in the port of
Houston, unlicensed seamen commenced a strike for union recognition and
boarding passes for union delegates. The strikers did not take possession of the
ship but remained on the poop-deck and refused to obey all orders. They were
never requested to leave. Sufficient steam was maintained for the operation of
all the ship's sanitary and safety appliances, and the vessel was never in danger.
When upon the ship's return to Philadelphia the steamship company discharged
.five of the seamen for participating in the strike, the National Labor Relations
Board ordered the company to offer reinstatement and back pay to these men.
Held, the order was affirmed on the ground that the strike was legal. The
dissent maintained the strike was unlawful since it violated the law of the sea
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and the shipping articles. Southern S. S. Co. v. National Labor Relations Board,

(C. C. A. 3d, 1941) 120 F. (2d) 505.
When a ship is on the high seas, almost every strike of its crew has been held
to constitute mutiny or revolt unless the ship is unseaworthy/ or unless the
master deviates voluntarily from the voyage described in the shipping articles. 2
But whether there can be a mutiny or revolt when the vessel is at dock in a
safe harbor is a controversial question which has received no recent adjudication. 3 It has been held that the refusal of the crew to put to sea or to obey the
master's orders while in port amounted to an endeavor to commit a revolt.4
If the strike is accompanied by acts of violence and the men take possession
of the ship, the strike is illegal and the National Labor Relations Board cannot
order reinstatement. 5 But three recent cases appear to hold that there can be no
mutiny when a ship is safely at dock. 6 However, each of these cases can be
distinguished from the principal case," and the really vital question in the prin1

United States v. Ashton, (C. C. Mass. 1834) 24 F. Cas. No. 14,470.
United States v. White, (D. C. N. Y. 1848) 28 F. Cas. No. 16,683.
8
The statutes, 35 Stat. L. II46 (1909), 18 U. S. C. (1934), §§ 483-484,
defining revolt and mutiny state that they can be committed on a vessel "on the high
seas, or on any other waters within the admiralty and maritime jurisdiction of the
United States." This would of course include all domestic harbors. The language is
significant, since the piracy statute, 35 Stat. L. II45 (1909), 18 U.S. C. (1934), §
481, says that piracy can be committed only "on the high seas."
4
United States v. Hamilton, (C. C. Mass. 1818) 26 F. Cas. No. 15,291;
United States v. Keefe, (C. C. Mass. 1824) 26 F. Cas. No. 15,509; United States
v. Gardner, (C. C. Mass. 1829) 25 F. Cas. No. 15,188. These decisions were later
followed, after the revision of the mutiny statute, in United States v. Cassedy, (C. C.
Mass. 1837) 25 F. Cas. No. 14,745; United States v. Lynch, (C. C. N. Y. 1843)
26 F. Cas. No. 15,648; United States v. Roberts, (C. C. N. Y. 1843) 27 F. Cas. No.
16,173; and United States v. Nye, (C. C. Mass. 1855) 27 F. Cas. No. 15,906. The
original mutiny statute, I Stat. L. II3 (1790), did not define the crime, but the 1835
revision, 4 Stat. L. 775 (1835), defined it in accordance with Justice Story's decisions
(see note 3) and reduced the penalty from death to hard labor. The final revision,
in 1909, 35 Stat. L. II46 (1909), 18 U. S. C. (1934), §§ 483-484, removed the
hard labor penalty. But it appears that, contrary to what one might expect, this
relaxation of the penalty has not enlarged the scope of the crime.
5
National Labor Relations Board v. Fansteel Metallurgical Corp., 306 U. S. 240,
59 S. Ct. 490 (1939). Thus the board's reinstatement order was reversed where the
crew took possession of the ship, prevented the vessel from sailing, and refused to allow
the sanitary arrangements and electric equipment to be used or food to be served to
anyone but themselves. Peninsular & Occidental S. S. Co. v. National Labor Relations
Board, (C. C. A. 5th, 1938) 98 F. (2d) 4u.
6
See Rothschild, "The Legal Implications of a Strike by Seamen," 45 YALE
L. J. II81 (1936); Sapiro and Frank, "Mutiny at the Dock," 25 CAL. L. REv.
41 (1936).
7
In Black Diamond S. S. Corp. v. National Labor Relations Board, (C. C. A.
2d, 1938) 94 F. (2d) 875, the strikers did not remain on board but left the ship. In
Bidwell v. Abbott, [1926] Queensland St. Rep. 196, a conviction was sustained for
wilful disobedience under the Merchant Shipping Act, and no mention was made
of mutiny. But since only one defendant was charged and not the entire crew, no
prosecution for mutiny would have been possible without proving cooperation between
2
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cipal case is not whether the strike constituted a mutiny but whether it was
illegal, since the National Labor Relations Board is powerless to order reinstatement, not only after a mutiny, but after any illegal sit-down strike. Several
tests have been suggested for determining the legality of strikes on shipboard in
the absence of violence or dispossession of the ship. The line might be drawn
between strikes at sea and in port, between strikes in ports of safety and of
refuge,8 between strikes in the home and in other ports,9 between strikes in
domestic and in foreign ports, or between strikes where the ship is safe and
those where it is unsafe without the obedience of the crew.10 Only by employing
the broad ~nd general test of safety can all the modern cases be reconciled; yet
this is the most difficult standard to apply and would necessarily entrust to the
biased strikers themselves the task of estimating that security and safety. A test
of pure safety is objectionable also because it takes into account only the immediate and present security of lives and cargo, whereas the ultimate safety of
the boat requi~es discipline at all times; for "A master who cannot control his
crew in port is not likely to be able to control it at sea." 11 Since the element of
safety to passengers, as opposed to mere inconvenience to consumers, is present
in seamen's strikes, all such strikes will continue to receive more criticism
than the ordinary industrial strike,12 despite the present legislative trend toward
enhancing the right to strike in general. The policy of the modern federal
statutes restricting the master's power 13 is to impose penalties on the master and
employer rather than encourage an extension of the right of seamen to strike.
two or more members of the crew. Further, to say that one of the seamen is guilty
of wilful disobedience is not to say that the entire crew is not guilty of mutiny. In
Weisthoff v. American-Hawaiian S. S. Co., (C. C. A. 2d, 1935) 79 F. (2d) 124,
the court held wages not to be forfeited by participation in a strike. But wages are not
torfeited for all mutinies except at common law, the mutiny statute providing other
remedies. See 23 CoRN. L. Q. 302 (1938). Only the statute, 38 Stat. L. u67
(1915), 40 U. S. C. (1934), § 701, on the offense of "wilful disobedience at sea''
provides for forfeiture of wages in all cases.
8 Thus it was held to constitute an endeavor to commit a revolt in Hamilton v.
United States, (C. C. A. 4th, 1920) 268 F. 15, where the crew struck three miles
from the dock in Hamilton harbor, a port of refuge where the ship was being repaired.
9 The economic leverage applied by a strike is far greater when the ship is in a
foreign port because of the added factor of wharfage charges which must .be paid there.
And since the company officers are at the home port, it is exceedingly difficult to negotiate with strikers two thousand miles away or to end the strike with any speed.
10 E.g., in Rees v. United States, (C. C. A. 4th, 1938) 95 F. (2d) 784, a conviction was sustained when a strike occurred in the port of Montevideo, where the
ship was not moored to a dock or at anchor in a safe harbor but in such a position that
obedience of the crew to tbe master's orders was essential to her safety.
11 23 CORN. L. Q. 302 at 306-307 (1938).
12 One court held that "the maritime safety laws are paramount to the National
Labor Relations Act wherever the Board's proposed orders may increase the danger
which the long established safety legislation of Congress seeks to prevent or lessen."
Texas Co. v. National Labor Relations Board, (C. C. A. 9th, 1941) 120 F. (2d) 186 at
187-188.
13 46 U. S. C. (1934), §§ 541-713. These statutes regulate provisions, medical
treatment, living accommodations, clothing, heating, ventilation, etc.
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The existence of these safe and adequate statutory remedies against the master
and the employer would seem to make seamen's strikes even less excusable today
than in the past. a

David N. Mills

u The two opinions in the principal case illustrate the conflicting approaches of
the Department of Labor, which looks on strikes by seamen as no different from any
other strikes [see Sapiro and Frank, "Mutiny at the Dock," 25 CAL. L. REv. 41
(1936)] and the Department of Commerce, which is primarily concerned with the
safety of American vessels, and which still considers lack of discipline the main cause of
unsafety [ see the Maritime Commission report, Economic Survey of the American
Merchant Marine, p. 43, H. Doc. No. 392, 75th Cong., 2d sess. (1937) ]. In McCrea
v. United States, 294 U. S. 23, 55 S. Ct. 291 (1935), the Supreme Court suggested
that it is not discipline but better working conditions that are needed for safety. But
it was observed in l 8 ORE. L. REv. l 28 ( l 939) that in none of these cases were the
strikes instigated to gain improved conditions of ~mployment. But it is submitted that
this is a short-sighted view, since the ultimate goal of all strikes is better working
conditions, jurisdictional strikes and strikes for union rights merely having as their
immediate goal the acquisition of a more efficient means of obtaining the same.

